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THE RELATION OF WATSON I AN BEHAVIORISM TO CERTAIN
CURRENT RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem Of The Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to review the principles of
behaviorism and the current evaluations of that psychology
preliminary to an attempt to discover therefrom the relation-
ship which "behaviorism bears to the more general problems of
religion. The thesis is not an evaluation of behavior! sti
c
psychology as a groundwork for a program of religious educa-
tion, nor is it a criticism of the metaphysical implications
of watsonian behaviorism.
B . The Importance Of the Re la t ion of psycho 1 ogy -and Religion
The significance of the relationship of psychology to
religion is perhaps often exaggerated because of the practical
bearing which psychology appears to have on religion. The
historical study of religion has provided the data for a so-
called psychology of religion. Psychology applied in many
fields is touching the practical matters which concern religion.
Questionings result. The interest of religion in the practical
problems of control is perhaps secondary to its concern for
values. It is here that religion is likely to find itself at
odds with certain types of psychology. Tor psychology, whether
it will or no, assumes certain metaphysical principles. The
r
7practices of religion are rooted in metaphysi cal assumptions.
So psychology becomes doubly implicated in the control problems
of religion.
The preservation of religious values appears to demand
that certain types of psychological theory be rejected. The
up
fate of values is inextricably bound/with an important issue in
psychology, that of the nature of mind or consciousness. Since
behaviorism of the -vatsonian "type is the clearest, most log-
ical, --nost unambiguous in its position as to the nature of con-
sciousness, when religion ana behaviorism neet, the general
issue between psychology and religion becomes more evident.
Religion has always had its scientific foes . Psychology is
at the present ti ae playing the role of the enemy.
G. Developments In Religion and In psychology .Vhich Affect
Their Relationship
The development of both religion and psychology in
Lhe recent past has brought their problems closer together.
It is fashionable just now to define religion as a "way of
life". Psychology is a science intimately concerned with the
'•ways of life 1*. In religion a priori conclusions on the
nature of God have in large part given way to an examination
of the religious experiences of men, as the point where God
.nay be found. The source of authority in religion, in Protest-
antism, is experience. The use of the experimental metnod in
the study of religion has brought religion into closer contact
with an experimental psychology.
Through methods in religion on the one hand and through
the philosophy of religion on the other, the findings of psy-

achology affect religion. Methods in religion must be
psychologically respectable. 2ie proponents of religious
education have here a particular interest, psychological
theories, they believe, will determine the method and goal of
(1)
education and influence the content of doctrine.
Psychology in the form it has taken in behaviorism
has practical andphilosophical implications which relate most
vitally to -eligi^us practice and belief. The concentration of
behaviorism on the physiological description as a full account
of life and its denial of consciousness appear to eliminate
all responsibility and free moral action. In its strict monism
oenaviorism outlaws the old mind-body pro clem. Religion
demands that some kind of a "consciousness" be ief t to man»
Behaviorism has all the difficulties of any psychology in its
relation to religion, plus this opinion about consciousness.
It is this "plus" that makes the conflict acute.
D. Materials Used In The Thesis
Everybody thinks th t he knows himself as something more
than a "mere machine 11 • This is the source of a -tack of many
of the opponents of behaviorism whether tney be laymen, scien-
tists, philosophers, or theologians. Hie variety of arguments
is profuse. Behaviorism is laughed at as an aosurdity, toler-
ated as a satisfactory partial method, critically examined for
scientific or philosophical fallacies, or intuitively and im-
mediately known to contradict the deeper experiences of life.
These attitudes are reflected in as many grades of writing;
non-scientific, polemic, irenically judicial, and technical.

9The motives are varied. One writer makes a remarkable con-
fession. It is much more intellectually respectable to find
behaviorism to be self contradictory or logically impossible
and therefore false than to find it contradictory of one's
assumptions and therefore wrong. This latter position is
admitted by the writer mentioned. Such honesty is worthy of
a quotation.
"A student .. .taught to reverence what has been
called the soul, finds himself .. .confronted by
developments in the field of psychology which
seem to give the lie to much, ...of that body of
philosophy, ethics, and religion upon which a
working and sustaining theory of life has been
built". (3)
It is impossible to take into account here the argu-
ments of such a variety and multiplicity of views. In fact,
the different criticisms from scientific 3,nd philosophical
viewpoints alone can scarcely be correlated into a unified dis-
cussion. In this thesis use is made of only those evaluations
of behaviorism which purport to be disinterested and objective.
However, since religion is as broad as life and finds expres-
sion in many forms, these unacknowledged protests are not to
be forgotten. It may be that these objections become estimably
articulate in the more academic writings-
S. The phases Of Behaviorism \yhich Are Treated In The Thesis
Only those theories of behaviorism which are relevant
to religious problems are given any consideration. The practi-
cality of behaviorism in the control of life and the meta-
physical implications of its method and aim are to be considered,
since they have a bearing on the method and content of religion.
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CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES 0? WATSON XAH BEHAVIORISM
A . The Use Qf The Object ive ::et::od In psy chol ogy
1. Psychology !3iiploys The Scientific Method Used By
Other Sciences,
Observation, experimentation, and statistical formulation
and interpretation are marks of scientific method. Observation
is also a practice of every-day life. Scientific ooservation
differs in that it is controlled and systematized. Instrumenta-
tion is mecessary in scientific investigation. A chronDScope,
not an ordinary watc>, may "be necessary in making observations
",'hich are exact enough to toe of use to science. To repeat the
conditions of the experiment, to isolate and vary the factors,
to control environmental elements is experimentation, when the
data secured from observation and experimentation are treated
statistically, the conditions of scientific method have toeen
met. Such is the method of toehaviori sti c psychology
•
2. 'The "Verbal Report* fte tr.od Peculiar to Psychology Is
Obj ective.
Variations in the application of scientific method are
many. psychology uses the "verbal r epor t«metho d
,
which can-
not be employed in other natural sciences, psychology, however,
is none the less scientific because it uses this method, nor
is the method any less objective because the response is ver-
bal. Speech is a form o f behavior, a habit system integrated
with the total activity of the organism. If the subject
responds with the word cold when a cold cylinder is applied to
t.1
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an area of the akin the behaviorist does not interpret the
response "cold" as the result of introspection on the part
of the subject. Ke did not look within somewhere to discover
a sensation; The word, "cold" was not the end result of in-
trospection, practically every reaction at this level is
an integration of three habit systems; the verbal, the vis-
ceral, and the manual. In this instance the predominating
system functioning in the response is the verbal. The response
is as objective as is the withdrawing of the hand from fire.
The situation is to ;je analyzed not in terms of consciousness
'.nd its contents, out in terms of behavior and its fundamental
units, the stimulus and response.
B • The Complexity Qf the Units Qf Behavior
1. A Stimulus Or Situation Is Always Complex.
Stimulus is a physiolo ical term. Before it is of use
in psychology it must be amplified* The human body is stimulated
in numberless ways through the various sense organs at any One
moment. As examples of single stimuli /at son mentions sound
wares,- gaseous particles, or particles of ..:atter which may
stimulate the end organs in the taste bulbs of the tongue. To
stimulate the human organism with such a single stimulus would
be possible, if at all, only under unusual experimental con-
ditions. A more complex stimulus is a light bulb. A still
more complex stimulus is the promise of a trip abroad. As a
matter of fact, the stimulus of psychology is never single, but
(5)
is a complex and integrated situation. A "situation" is a
complex group of stimuli. in anticipation of a later paragraph,
it may be added here that the complexity of the situation is
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increased again by the conditioning of stimuli; Unconditioned
stimuli are numerous, out conditioned situations are beyond
number
.
2. One Situation Ifoy grouse A V&riety of Responses
A specific situation does not call forth an invariable
response. A stimulus can scarcely be said to be 'given ".As
7/atson says, it is not an entity about somewhere waiting to
serve to produce an action. \ye appear to do a number of dif-
ferent things in the presence jf any given stimulus, water
may be the given stimulus. \ye do not always drink water when
we see it. ve aay put it in a test tube, use it to extinguish
a fire, or to flood a pond for skating. In this instance, the
water is the stimulus which calls for a response. The response
is not predetermined oy the stimulus, out varies. \s a matter
of fact, the stimulus itself varies with the response, since
the stimulus is never just water and nothing mo i e . It is ra xher
he whole situa-ion in which water is a factor related to the
other factors. When the situation of which water is a part is
in any respect altered, uhe stimulus called water is also
changed. It is in effect another stimulus. "Man is prepared to
meet any slight change in the situation or object with an
appropriate change in the response. " ' ' A slightly changed
situati jn is in reality a new situation. '/atson means the same
thing when he speaks of a change in the situation and the con-
ditioning of a stimulus. The ohange in the response is due to
ihe fact that th« stimulus has been conditioned. The candle
for which the baby reaches is conditioned after the infant
has experienced burning. The Candle as a stimulus is only one
factor in the complex situation. The burning is another factor
of the total situation and as such conditions the .situation in
»
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which the candle next appears. The adjubtrnent is a response
to the entire situation of which the candle is only a part. A
more accurate statement, then, than that a situation may arouse
a variety of response is that although a number of different sit-
uation may be related "by the possession of one identical factor,
the reaction any one situation will call out is deterra in ed by all
the stimuli in the situation and not by the specific stimulus
(7)
which is common to the various situations. This fact of
multiple response to a so called . i ven stimulus a ids to the dif-
ficulty of predicti >n of action, prediction with a view to con-
rol is what the jsycholo. i st aims for* But the difficulty is
not to oe taken as >iaking understanding an impossibility. Unere
^re "def ini te factors present which rationalize behavior
(3)
and give it a causal basis."
3. The Important Determinants of Behavior Are within
The Organism.
Before it is possible to predict the response to an ob-
ject one must consider the "genera 1 setting of the whole sit-
uation. The "situation as a whole" includes not only the obvious
objects to which t:.e subject is said to respond, but the relation
of those objects to other environmental features, and the con-
dition of the experiencing subject. His emotional condition, hi
s
immediately past experiences, and his whole history are of
significance. In a list of the determining factors in a situa-
(9)
tion these are given as the more important. If the response
made to the flag today differs from that made last week, we may
conclude that something in the immediate situation or in the
experience of the subject during the week is the essential cause
of the change in the behavior, ihe flag does not call out an in-
variable response.
t
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4. A Response Is the Integrated Activity Of The Entire
Organism.
The behavior or response produced by a complex stimulus
or situation is also highly integrated. A familiar example of
a simple response is the patellar reflex or the turning toward
a light. But just as p-sychojlogy expanded the physiological
significance of stimulus :o mean the total situation, so the
response in which the psychologist is interested psychology has
transformed into a complex. Responses might he graded according
to their increasing complexity. The more highly organized
responses are such things as building houses, writing books,
or conducting a Red Cross Campaign. The response is not an
entity. Life is not a series of one response following another
single response . Behavior is rather integrated systems of
action. The organism behaves when it functions as a whole,
c>uch is the behavior which psychology studies. The separate
systems of reaction are themselves integrations of reflexes, and
in turn are organized in larger, more inclusive responses which
we name. '.Ye say that the individual plays ball or mails a let-
ter to a friend. These units of action are responses. Their
complexity makes then not something other than what the psychol-
ogist means by "response". A response is not a single twitch
of a muscle nor a series of such. It is the total activity of
a reacting or gin ism,
5» The Conditioning of Response Is "j;eaning M .
The complexity of the units of behavior, of the stimulus
and response, -iake it difficult to say in the total situation
just what is the stimulus and what is the response. The highly
ti
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important determining factors in the situation are in the
conditions of the organism. These conditions are products
of past or present responses. The situation seems to be
nothing other than the sum total of past responses plus the
immediate organic and environmental conditions, and the response
nothing other than a nascent situation or factor in a subsequent
situation. It is obvious, ..hen, that the principle of multiple
response to a single stimulus, and the basic principle of
behaviorism, that of conditioning of reactions and situations,
(10)
are one and the same. furthermore, this is what meaning is.
Meaning is that which determines the response which is made to
the stimulus. "Meaning is just a way of saying that out of all
the ways the individual has of reactint to this o'b^9o at a at any
one time he reacts in only one of these ways..." The
important determinating factors are within the organism. Mean-
ing is constituted in the condition of the organism, an din its
past history as active at the moment. "Meaning is just one
$12)
way of telling what the individual is doing. 1 '
C . The Problem Qf psychology As The Study Qf The "Whole Man"
1. Stimulus And Response Are Observed As Revealing The
Total Behavior.
That the behaviorist studies the entire acting human
organism it seems difficult for any except a behaviorist to
understand. He is accused on the one hand of being a "muscle
physiologist" and on the other, of neglecting the nervous
(i3)
system. His own contention is that he studies both
muscles and nerves as a part of a whole organism. The nervous
system serves to integrate the complex activity of the organism
4
l6
and thus becomes an important factor in the whole development
.
It is because the behaviorist puts the emphasis on the whole
reaction rather than the part that he appears to neglect the
nervous system. The behaviorist prefers not to use the brain
(14}
as a "mystery box", an obliging contrivance which accounts for
all we cannot explain. We can study explicit habits more
profi tably, because more accurately, that chemical changes in the
nervous system. The former we can observe. Implicit habits
are important. They include neural, muscular, and glandular
activities, bodily sets, and thinking or subvocal tarlking.
These implicit activities eventuate in over, behavior and as
such become observable and socially significant. Consequently
the behaviorist concentrates on a study of the stimulus and
response, the ends of the total process as the best expression
of the total action. He neglects what intervenes on_y in so
rar as he is compelled to do so by the conditionsof experimen-
tation. To watch behavior is his only method of acquiring
information beyond what a study of the physiology of the nervous
system gives,
2. The Study of ©notions Is Necessary To An Understanding
Of the Activity of The tfhole Organism
In a behavioristri c study of emotions, such as sadness,
fear, or love, the questions asked are what does the organism
do when in these states. Vjhat is r,he effect of emotion on the
total activity? Why does the individual act emotionally in the
situation? How did the emotion arise? The more general prob-
lems are of e.motion-1 stability and control, of the integration
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of the emotional and habit systems, of how "emotional life
(15)
as a wh o 1 e hang 3 to g e ther M .
The complete answer to such questions is not found by
an analysis of the chemical changes in isolated muscle or
gland. Tj say what the subject does under controlled stimula-
tion is to give a ^uller and -ore useful account of emotion.
3« The Study Of Habit Is Necessary To An Understanding
Of The Activity Of The Whole Organism.
In a study of habit the significant question is, what
is the organism doing and what can it be trained to do. .That
is the possibility of forming certain habits and retaining
them 2 The question is solved by observing the activity of
the individual, b./ giving performance, tests, and by a study
of the past record of the subject rather than by analysis of
secretions and measurements of uscular movements. Neither
will a study of sensation, .or image tell us anything of
habit. The behaviorist studies that action which he can observe.
He may watch a brick-layer at work. He records the number of
bricks he can lay in an hour, in an eight-hour day. He takes
account of the influence of fatigue. He also may inquire whether
the worker is an apprentice or a man of long experience at his
trade. To learn of such behavior the psychologist must study not
part activities, but the whole organization of the personality.
In such a case there is present the highly integrated activity
of the manual, visceral, and laryngeal habit systems.. It is only
when the entire integrated activity of the e oimultaneous
habit systems is studied that an answer can oe given to the
question, "fhat is he doing and why is he doing it?*«
1\
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The reports of Watson's experiments bear out his statement that
his first interest is not in the secretion of .lands and the
so interested
twitching of muscles. If he were/ he would fill his books with
descriptions of the instruments for taking measurements, such
as the galvanometer, which measures the varying resist .nee of
the body to faint electrical currents. The records of experi-
ments he would give in statistical or tabular form instead of
in the everyday language used in reporting any observation of
be! avior
.
' To the insistence of the enthusiastic opponent of
behaviorism that Watson reduces life to a "series of jerking
(16)
muscles and spewing glands", the behaviorist can only
reply that the integrated activ.i; of the whole organism is
what he observes and describes.
4. Thought Is A part Of A Whole Bodily Response.
This belief that bodily activity is an integration of
all the habit systems and that it is artificial to single out
any part reaction of the total organization, explains the
behaviori stic position on the oroblera of thought, -br the
,
(1?) •
oehaviorist "thought is the action of language techani sms •
The organs, muscles, and neurones involved in speech are a part
of the total action. Thought is in such a setting. The fact
that thinking is internal speech and therefore hidden from
ordinary observation has led to the practice of abstracting it
from its place in the integrated bodily activity. Thinking
is implicit activity and therefore not easy to .explain. For
others than the behaviorist L..e hidden is mysterious. 60
thought becomes for trie introspecti'oni st something more than
bodily activity. Watson believes that could these thought
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processes be made as evident as the overt reactions in the
familiar activities such as walking or building a house,
thought would no longer be a mystery, accountable for only by
the concepts of spirit, mind, or self,
5. Personality Is The Sum of Habit Reactions.
From the standpoint of the behaviorist a person is a
highly integrated biological organism or ••organic machine",
the sum total of all the habit systems, personality is nothing
over and above these separate reaction systems functioning to-
gether in one organism. There is no "something more" which
unifies, organizes, or directs activity; neither a soul nor the
more refined self or consciousness . 7/hatever the name given
to this principle, it is only "another name for the soul of an-
(13)
cient times". To continue to use such a concept is evidence
of an "unwillingness to admit that the individual has within
(19)
himself all of the determining factors for action". All
soul theories Watson believes are influenced by a "subtle relig-
ious philosophy". The concept of consciousness is not needed
in science, nor psychology. There is no evidence that conscious-
ness exists.
When personality is treated as the totality of an indi-
vidual habit system, it is possible to formulate laws by which
one can not only understand what a personality is, but can also
direct the development and organization of the habit and
emotional systems of an individual, personality thus becomes a
useful concept in the problem of control of growth.
ft
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D ' Personality Is Built Up Through The Organizatio n Of Unlearned
And Conditioned Responses .
1. The Development Of Personality Is a problem Of Con-
ditioning and Reconditioning Responses,
The behaviori s ti c psychologist is interested Min synthesis
(as) «" Vw, , +
^ls well as analysis' 1 . His problems gravitate toward con-
ditions and processes of growth. Growth is not a straight line
development • It involves reorganization of reaction complexes
as well as the organization of new habits. What can a person
do and what can be be trained to do are questions put by the
behaviori st . The individual can ce trained because his actions
may be conditioned and unconditioned. They are not determined
by tendencies, disposition, inherited talent, or instinct, oince
all complex activity is built of units of simpler bodily cottrdina
tions, the building up process can be brought under control.
Education is possible. The three types of habit systems all
originate in the same way. They also develop similarly. To
guide the growth of personality is to condition and organize
these various habit systems,
2* Habits, As Units Of personality, May Be Conditioned,
personality is the total habit r action system of an
individual. This is an integration of numerous organized systems
Each system is composed of lower organized units and in turn is
a unit in a higher integration. The key to the formation of a
personality is the conditioning of these units or organized
systems. Reactions can be controlled by the conditioning of the
stimuli
.
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3. Emotions As Conditioned Habit Patterns Iflay Be Built
Into The Organization of personality .
( 21)
"Emotions are conditioned habit patterns" They
are developed and conditioned as any other habit, Tne
educational problem in respect to emotion is that of elimina-
ting an emotion when it is productive of useless or detrimental
activity, and to build into the habit patterns emotions which
facilitate satisfactory adjustments. Education which neglects
the control of emotional development ignores one of the most
potent forces in education, Emotion nay serve as a "drive" to
action. Emotion either as a habit of reaction or as a drive
is of equal importance with habit in personality.
Through the organization of manual, emotional, and
thought habits rather than through an attempted control by
"ideals" will the control of human behavior be effected.
Su ch is Wa t son ' s th eo ry
.
E • THe Effect Of The Disuse Of The Concept Of Consc iou sness
That psychological concepts are basic in the social
sciences is unquestioned. Watson's assumption that psychol-
ogy will affect education, ethics, philosophy, and religion
seems to be reflected in the objections to his system, tfatson
makes the following predictions for the "mental sciences",
^c-ciology will merge with economics and behaviori stic social
psychology, which is a study of how -he social groups form
•^.nd control the habits of tne individual member. Ethics will
become a laboratory science. An ethic based on the concept
of "soul" has not shown us what is the best in life nor how

that best may be ina.de a facts prejudice rather than science
has been in control of human welfare. The social sciences
have failed to control behavior behavior because they have
not made ethics experimental. They have worked under the
patronage of religion rather than science.
The behaviorist would replace religion by experimental
ethics. Watson thinks that religion may have originated in
the discovery that one could control is leaser brother by
fear. Religion still thrives in fear. On any other basis it
would vanish. Religious habits are conditioned responses
which often do not lead to the most satisfactory adjustments
in life. Reacting to meat as unclean is not as beneficial
as reacting to it as something having certain nutritive value.
Under the compulsion of behaviori s ti c psychology the social
sciences will in time give up the use of the concept of con-
sciousness for the formulation of new fundamental concepts
which are scientific.
F. Behaviori stic Freedom, A Social Ideal
"You have already grasped the notion that the behaviorist
is a strict determinist * . . -the child or adult has to do wh^t
he does do. The only way he cafi be made to act differentlv is
( za)
first to untrain him and then to retrain him rt I-l we would
know what Yfetsoni means by "determini sra »•
,
we must interpret this
statement as a part of Watson *s system of psychology. A habit
system may be temproarily or per lanently dominant. Certain
habits or responses are entirely impossible, sometimes b ecause
of the structure of the organism, but more often simply because
they do not harmonize with the dominant habit system of the
individual. To accept consciousness or soul as a psychological
s
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concept indicates an "unwillingness to adrait that the individual
(23)
has within himself ail the determining factors for action 11 . This
statement has "been quoted before. It is repeated here tha t it
may be seen in relation to a statement about determinism.
Is such behavioriotic determinism freedom or is "behavior-
istic freedom M determinism? Whatever implication others may
think behaviorism carries for the question of the free development
of personality or habits, watson believes that his system of psy-
chology affords the method for social control, when the old
shackles of mythology and custom have been destroyed.
The relation of religion and behaviorism as Watson states
it is direct and simple. Y/atson finds religion a detriment to
social progress. The scientific viewpoint should replace the
religious, behavior! sti c ethics supplant the religious values
and ideals. But different interpretations of ".Vatsoni an .Behav-
iorism and of religion introduce other relations. A discussion
of the wider implications of behaviorism for religion will
follow after Chapters III andIV, which are an appraisal of
'Vatson's system of psychology
•
•
CHAPTER III
CRITICISM OF WATSONIAH
BEHAVIORISM
A. Intro duct ion
1. Content of The Chapter.
This chapter deals with the criticisms of 'behaviorism
which center around the problem of method, mechanical explan-
ation of behavior, and tr e nature of consciousness. They
refer to 'flat son 1 s , theories stated in the preceding chapter,
that the objective method should be used in p syetiology, that
behavior is the complex response o^ an organism to a situa-
tion, and that the explanation of personality is to be fjund
in the habit systems of man rather than in the assumption of
a unique organizing principle such as consciousness. There
follows in Chapter IV a criticism of ^i^se principles as
applied to the problems of religion involved in a psychology
of religion and religious education.
2. * The Points of View Fr am Which Behaviorism Is
Criticized .
The fact that behavioristic psychology is not limited
to the strict "hehaviorist and the near behaviorist, but in
certain of its aspects is characteristic of almost all psychol-
ogies, accoun ts in part for the confusi on in the countless
discussions concerning behaviori sm . The writers often fail to
distinguish just which behaviorism they intend to inveigh
against. A criticism may begin with an objection to Watsonian
behaviorism and very soon turn about, let us say, some phase

of the problem of instinct in such a way that it cannot possioly
apply to Wat sonian behaviorism. 3uch indiscii ftinate discussions
make it difficult to single .out the current criticism of Vatson-
ian behaviorism. The task is further complicated in that the
viewpoints from which the cri-icisms ire made are as numerous as
those who make the judgments. The dualist and the exponent of
emergent evolution may in certain respects offer identical
criticisms of behaviorism. These apparent agreements, however,
are fundamentally unlike, since each has evaluated behaviorism
according to the demands of his own theory. A review of these
discussions should take into account the presuppositions on
which they are made. Yet to do so in any detail would lead
away from the central problem of the thesis.
3. The Method Of Review
One method of reviewing these discussions is to study
each contribution or evaluation separately .relating it to the
system of thought of its author. Another possible method is
to attempt to disentangle from numerous writers those arguments
which occur most frequently and have at least a seeming funda-
mental relationship. The danger of this last method is that
the review may become general and inaccurate . Since the aim
of the thesis is to discover those more general aspects of
behaviorism which have implications for religious thought, che
first method lias not been followed. The second approach is
in part that used here. 30 much of the refutation of Y/atsonian-
ism is contained in assertions and elaboration of the opposite
view that it takes much piecing together of diverse parts to
formulate a unitary and logical protest. To make these chapters
f
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representati ve of current thinking about behaviorism, however,
the following sections do represent a selection of the best
evaluations of aehaviorism from various sources, and a combin-
ation into a consistent whole in so far as this was permissible
or possible.
B. The Metaphysical Assumptions of The '•Verbal Report'' Method •
1. The Objective Method Is Generally Accepted.
The objective and introspective methods in psychology are
not the basis of any strict division among psychologists. Some
few, with Watson, -eject without reservation introspection.
More often the psychologist will admit the use of both methods,
attributing to each more or less efficacy in certain phases of
psychological investigation. Miss Calkins, perhaps, finds a
wider use for and value in the purely introspective method than
others. However, she uses the method of observation and exper-
imentation in so far as they are loplicable. she believes that
(24)
we can observe the self, but cannot experiment with it.
Subjective method must supplement where objective method fails,
Koffka studies psychology as a science of behavior, but he be-
lieves it is not possible to understand behavior completely by
i study of overt activity. The inner experience which is a
corelate of ocservable behavior necessitates the use of
"descriptive concepts". lie renames introspection "experiential
U5)
ooservat ion". Tne "functional concepts" are used in accounting
for observable behavior. The two sets af concepts give a full
aescription of total behavior. He would use the descriptive
concepts only when necessary.
I
These two uses of the introspective method are
representative of the evaluation psychology puts upon it. In
one way or another the psychologists find use for introspection.
Watson's complete repudiation of introspection is consistent
with his belief that consciousness under any name is a surrepti-
tious introduction of the "soul 14 . Bat '•mind"
,
"Consciousness",
and "self" are not necessarily so regarded. Psychologists
retain these concepts together with the objective method* That
introspection has cone to be a minor method is inevitable since
the behaviori stic viewpoint has been widely accepted. Here I
use -'behaviori stic " to mean not Wat soniani sm
,
but that emphasis
on mind as activity. Methodological behaviorism
,
or behaviorism
"as only a method" is widely accepted. The criticism of V/atson's
method, then, comes from those who see it satisfactory so far as
it goes. Too often the criticism of method as a failure to include
all the facts overlooks bhe meaning of "verbal report".
2. Watson's Interpretation of "Verbal Report" as Objective
Lata Is Significant.
Watson does not, as those who accuse him of excluding facts
fail to see, attempt to get a psychological explanation which
takes no account of the reported response of the subject. The
"verbal report" as -stated on page 11 is itself a reaction,
to be treated as any other response. Another psychologist gets
the same information from an introspective report that v/atson
obtains from a "verbal report". Yet rep eatedly the opponents of
Watson assume that he can get no information from the words of
his subject, if he is to be consistent. The important point is
t
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in the interpretation of the language response. Here there is
disagreement. His interpretation of the verbal report as objective
data, identifies 3peech with behavior. The "excluded facts" are
actually included. They are reinterpreted under metaphysical as-
sumptions which the opponents of beh aviorism deny.
3 . The Criticism of Behavioris tic Method Resolves Into
A Denial Of The Assumptions On which It i s Based.
-That behavior can be explained in terms of physics and
chemistry is for the behaviorist no longer a Hypothesis. It is
a part of his philosophy. Method relates to content. This is
recognized by those who say behaviorism is "only a method".
They mean that it is only one method, the one which can report
on explicit behavior. They reserve the "inner experiences"
for treatment by another method. "/ato on agrees that his method
cannot reach the "inner experiences", whi ch are fictions of the
intr ospecti oni st . The facts of the introspectionist Watson
(26)includes by reinterpreting them as implicit oehavior. The con-
troversy over method is converted into assertions about assum-
tions. ',?dtson's assertion is that consciousness is behavior
.
The opposite assumption is that consciousness is something unique,
not to be explained under the categories of physical science.
C
.
v/at8on*s Account Of Behavior As le chani cal Bo es No t iiacpla i
n
P ay cho 1 0 g i cal Beh-, v i o r Nor Account for leaning And Value.
1. The Differential of Psychological Behavior Is That It
Is Purposive.
Psychologists a e now asking a question to parallel
the query "what is consciousness". That question is, "what is
behavior-'?". More exactly, they ask, what differentiates the
0*
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behavior ffhich the psychologist studies from that of molecules
or inorganic objects. Man behaves, out so does an avalanche.
If psychology is defined as a study of behavior, behavior itself
must be defined. Hunter has seen that behavior is too general
( 27 )
a term. His remedy is to use another word "Anthror-onomy" •
( 23 )
Another answer is that of Bode. He believes that if psy-
chology is to oe more than or different from a section of biology
and physiology it must take as its field the study of conscious
behavior, fatson takes stimulus and response as the units of
oebavior. Vith this Bode agrees. However, ne believes that
action is "behavior" only When the response can be related to
its stimulus in such a way that the stimulus is not antecedent
to the response, but both are functioning at the same time by
virtue of the fact that the future consequence of the stimulus
is an essential feature of it which is operative from the be-
ginning. Conscious behavior is differentiated from other be-
( 29 )
havior in that it involves a "certain process of organization"
or progressive change in the stimulus, which process eventuates
in motor response. Jhis future reference is one of the most
significant marks of psychological behavior. "To be in ex"oeri-
(30 )
ence at .all is to have the future operative in the present"
Behavior is not a fixed, rigid, determined sequence. The charac-
ter of stimulus and response as not complete, but progressive,
and contingent make possible activity in the present which has
reference to the future. "Conscious" behavior then may be
identified with purposive behavior*
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2. purposive Behavior Requires "Consciousness" As
A Causal factor.
It is the supposedly necessary relation of purposive
behavior to consciousness that calls out much of the insistence
that consciousness be recognized. Those who criticise behav-
iorism as mechanistic are those who hold that consciousness is
causative, Walter Albion Squires, who is as clear in his way
as Watson is in his, makes certain this point.
"If consciousness can affect human conduct, man is
not a mechanism and the mechanistic psychology is
untrue. If consciousness cannot affect human con-
duct, man is a mechanism and the purposive psychol-
ogy is untrue" ( 3 1 )
I general criticism of behaviorism is certain to in-
clude this, that behaviorism cannot adequately explain purpos-
ive behavior f since it does not admit consciousness as a causal
principle, junctional psychology defined mind as a function of
the biological organism. i£ind aided the adaptive process.
SUnctionalism has left this idea with psychology. Mind does
something. It is not something which is a structure to be
analyzed. The criticism that behaviorism is mechanistic is
allied with the supposition that consciousness is a selective
agency or principle which directs life.
However, the assumption that purposive behavior is a
result of consciousness is not an essential part of all those
psychological theories which find room for consciousness or
mind or self. Koffka believes that full experience includes
consciousness, yet he does not relate consciousness to behavior
(32 )
as causal. Hiss Calkins o ejects to the identification
of the self with the ^on-physical cause of the metaphysician,
for one may assert on introspective ground, the existence of
*
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self without believing that the self is directly experienced
(33)
as cause of anything". In Misa Calkins psychology the self,
not con sciousness, is fundamental.
The person who conceives of consciousness as causally
related to behavior will ever see "behaviorism as mechanistic.
Purpose, for him, requires mind as something more than bodily
mechanism, as something which makes possible the unitary for-
ward looking experience. The assumptions of the an ti -behavior-
i st and behavior ist have crossed.
3. Comparison Of The principle of Closure and Configura-
tion With That of Determination 3y The "$hole Situation" as
Allowing ?or purpose and Value.
The fact that pit son denies consciousness as causal would
not necessarily imply that his system might not include purpos-
ive activity. Consciousness is not necessarily of such a nature
as to be a causal and selective principle. "Furthermore, the
r ein terpretat ion of mechEn.lsm. as not exclusive of teleology will
render invalid the charge that behaviorism cannot account for
purposive activity because it is mechanistic. The concern, in
the problem of purpose is not to show that action must be free,
non-predictable, persistent, spontaneous, the work of a mind or
"hormic" principle, but that behavior has meaning and is of value.
Desire and value are the end factors in purposive behavior, pur-
posive behavior attains value. This constitutes its essential
meaning. Can TJat sonian behaviorism provide a system which is
not exclusive of value?
4 comparison of Koffka's system with that of 7/atson will
make clear both this less restricted interpretation of purposive

behavior as contained in a self-directing system, and may
suggest why ty&taon's account of personality as integration of
habit systems has not been accepted as providing for value nor
his definition of meaning as being meaningful*
Two important words in Koffka»s psychology are ••closure"
and "configuration". Kb fflea rejects vitalism. The principle
of "closure" accounts for instinctive activity. The end action
is itself a part of the stimulus. The principle of closure may
be illustrated by the experiment with the string on a soap-film.
A piece of string thrown in a loop upon a soap-film will, when
the film within the loop is pricked, take the form of a circle.
The quality of circularity or the position taken by the loop of
string was as much a part of the stimulus as the pin prick, in
the sense that the "end situation" operates to determine the
"transitional situation" or the movement from stimulus to end-
(34)
si tuation
.
This principle of "closure" is operative in all intelli-
gent actions, which are end-reaching activities. However,
"closure", which accounts for purposive activity in instinctive
action or mechanical events, is not sufficient to account com-
pletely for intelligent activity. It is in the difference in
Koffka's and .vatson's accounts of learning or of intelligent be-
havior that that provision ^or value may be made. It seems to
lie possible to say that .yatson employs in its essentials the
principle of "configuration" in his account of the nature of a
complex situation and of conditioning. The important difference
is that 7/atson accounts for learning by trial and error, while
rc
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Koffka says learning involves ••insight'1
.
"•Insight" into the
situation involves an understanding of the meaning of the whole
complex. Without "meaning 1 * there cannot be value, latson's
definition of meaning given on page appears to his critics
to be meaningless. It does not include value. That it is on
the question of meaning or value that religion and behaviorism
disagree is the conclusion reached at the close of chapter VI.
cc
3*
CHAPTER IV
CRITICISM 0"? THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
OF RELIGIOH A ID THE 3SH AVI0RI3TIC METHOD Of
CONTROLLING BEHAVIOR
A. The Trend In The pevelopmen t of psychology As It Influences
The Psychology of Religion.
1. Change in psychological method and Soul Theories Have
TTade Psychological ^explanation of Religion Increasingly Diffi-
cult.
Religion claims to arise out of inner experience and to
relate to reality. That psychology which recognizes such spir-
itual reals as religion knows can best provide an explanation
of religion which is not contradictory to what religion has al-
ways judged itself to he. Aristotle's doctrine of the soul as
the moving principle manifesting itself in life functions at
different levels, interactionism, or parallelism at least make
possible a home for things religious. The faculty psychology
with its pluralistic notion of mind could supply a spiritual
faculty to cover religious experience.
,\ compromise with a more
naturalistic psychology results in the explanation of religion
(35by attributing to man an instinctive tendency toward religion
(36)
or a special religious capacity.
'The introspective method, while not making necessary
the positing of a spiritual soul, does make easy an explana-
tion of the inner experiences of religion. As psychology has
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"become more empirical and the introspective method has
yielded more and core of the field of psychology to the objective
method, an explanation of the religious experience in psychol-
ogical terms has become more difficult.
The trend in psychology has been from the study of the
soul to a study of behavior and from the introspective to the
objective method* This is a part of the making of psychology
one of the natural sciences. As psychology has been natural-
ized more and more it has come to interpret religion as a
natural phenomenon. To save religion from the illusorinesii to
which it has been reduced by psychological analysis, the effort
to explain religion -statural", yet not illusory, has resulted
in a distorted religion or an impossible psychology. Hauser
gives us both: "M&n is so constructed that unless he is tied
up closely with his Ifaker, to receive on the receptive org ins
of his personality the stimuli which go out from His supreme
and holy personality, he can not live up tj the best that is
(37)
in him..." The Holy Spirit becomes a "stimulus acting
(33)
on the nervous system of man". in explaining certain
educational processes in religion he writes, "..we would say
that through some biological quality in the sensory motor nerve
which we may call religious sensibility, and which we have
learned to consider a divine endowment, these educational
stimuli pass over into the motor nerve and religious conduct re-
(39)
suits ..." .
Religion may be more beautifully explained as an illusion.
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2* The Historical Method In the Psychology of Religion
Has Resulted In Denial of Objective Reference Of Religious
3xper ienc e
.
a. The Data4 'Ihe data for the studies in the psychology
of religion have "been taken from sociology, anthropology, the
studies of primitive religions, and the lives of mystics. The
psychological studies *iave ov&Vh on historical fact rather than
immediately observed activities. The psychology of religion
has never been an experimental study. The complexity of trie
forms of developed religion has forced the investigator back to
the study of primitive wroups • Origins were sought. The gen-
eral result has been the interpretation of religion in terms
of origin or its primitive form. Religion ,found to be closely
related to other values, has been entirely explained in terms
of social, ethical, an :\ psychological principles. Religion as
a unique value or experience has been denied.
b. The Principles of Explanation : The moreimpor tant
principles of explanation under which religion has been
humanized and naturalized are projection and subjectivism.
Progress in the sciences has been made through an o o-
jective and disinterested stady of nature. The social scientist
has envied the natural scientist his success. He has come to
fear lest his own method is less "productive because less dis-
interested, less objective, less influenced by the prejudices
and desires of the investigator. Consequently the fear of
anthropomorphism haunts the psychologist . He must escape it
€
in his own investigations and recognize it in his explanations
of human experience. Projection is a result of this inclina-
tion of man to interpret the world in terms of himself. Under
such a principle, God is explained -s a projection of the
group spirit or of 'nan's desires. Han personifies his own spirit
( 40
)
projects i<t into the universe, and calls it God.
Subjectivism is another principle for bringing the
supernatural under psychological explanation. The religious man
believes he has relations with a God whose reality is as certain
as his own- The psychologist admits roan is seeking a God, -.nd
in that seeking has by projection posited a God. The answer the
God lakes is but the echo of man's voice. But the echo has a
salutary effect on nan. Religious exercises are psychological
purgatives of cental ills.
3- Answers Are Made Which Attempt To Save Religion As
A Real Experience.
Such a psychology of religion has eliminated God from
the religious experience much as the development in psychology
has eliminated the soul as a psychological concept. At least
both Go 1 and the soul must be redefined to fit the facts. Such
a psychology may be a satisfactory basis for a humanistic
religion, but the doubt it casts on the validity of the relig-
ious experience makes it unsatisfactory to the t,-.eistic view
in religion. Different answers are made to such an interpreta-
tion. One way is bo deny the right of psychology to interpret
the
religion, another to show p fallacy in/evaluation of principles
of projection and subjectivism, another to point out the limits
of the field of any natural science, and the inherent inadequacy
(
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of science to deal with the ultimate reals.
The first answer comes from those who have a particular
interest in practical religion. Horton, writing in the Journal
( 41
)
of Religion; sees the result of such a psychology in the
prevalent religious doubt. Siany people have actually, as he
sees it, ceased to he religious when they hive come to believe
that in their religious practices they are their own doctors.
The remedy he recommends is tr . theology oe no longer made a
branch of psychology.
A more direct criticism turns upon an analysis of
subjectivism and projection. Such a psychology seems to imply
chat because there is possibility of error, there is error.
The possibility of error does not make all reasoning invalid.
Our knowledge of truth comes through "subjective conditions i( f
The validity of that knowledge or experience is tested by the
truth of the specific reference to reality. To quote Valentine:
"Projection, then, is the only instrument we have for
knowledge of reality; but when rightly referred md
relevantly tested, it becomes the key to the inter-
pretation of the meaning and nature of the world of
objectivity. . . .'tfhat is false in projection turns upon
the test and verification..." (4^)
Goe answers the question of the validity of projection by
stating another problem. 'The value of projection awaits or
depends upon the value of %elves" (43 )
Another solution is offered in' the limitation of science.
The scientific method involves abstraction. Science can speak
with authority only on those aspects of experience which it
has abstracted from the total situation, physics deals with
weights and velocities, with what can be read as a measurement
on a scale. But the quality of the suostance who^e pattern
0
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physics 3r_as described escapes scientific explanation.
The qualitative aspect of nature or of mind which science fails
to account for need not remain forecer mi sunders too d f since the
scientific nay of-knowing is not the only means- Applied to
the psychology of religion, this principle implies that the
nature of the religious experience may have escaped the nethod
of the psychological investigator
•
B- Divergent Assumptions Underlying the Agreemen t of Religion
And Behaviorism In Their Aim To Control And Reform Behavior
i. Behaviorism and Religion Aim To Control And Direct
Behavior
.
Behaviorism a a natural science, aims to predict and
control behavior. Such an aim relates psychology immediately
to life, psychological principles have "been applied extensively
in medicine, in "business, and in education. It is Watson* s
belief that a universal application of scientific principles
and methods would give us a new world to live in. Behaviorism
aims primarily to understand behavior and control it.
Religion has always been an instrument of control . That
religion still seeks to control is evidenced by the present
renewed interest in religious education. Religious education is
an attempt to control through ideals. The general aim of relig-
ious education as st .ted by numerous writers is represented by
Dean Athearn's statement that "Christian education is the in-
(44
troduction of control into experience in terms of Jesus Christ".
That right conduct is not made equal to religion, that religious
values a;:e not identified with ethic .1 values, and that the
development of "God-consciousness M is not omitted in religious
education »if such ducation is to continue to be religious is
<<
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included in the definition of aim given by Same and Steviok:
•'...to foster a consciousness of God and a loyalty to His will,
for its untold value as a motive in the right control of
conduct . ( 45)
2. The Importance of Training Trie Amotions Is Generally
Recognized.
The importance of the emotional development as it affects
conduct is now recognized. The public school has been negligent
of the emotional growth of its children, it has produced no
technique for establishing certain emotional responses. But
what has been need not always be. The psychological study of
educational problems has lead to an interests in emotion as
the motive power for conduct. Adolph tfeyer makes the highest
aim of education to include training of the emotions as well
as the intellect. ( 46 ) The report "On The Educability Of The
Emotions" submitted by a council of iioston teachers is evidence
that public schools are aware of the importance of the emotional
factor in conduct. The degree of importance Watson attaches to
emotional development may be judged from the number of experi-
ments he has made in this field, and his contribution to the
psychology of emotions.
Religion is and always has been a thing of the emotions
as well as the mind. Religious leaders have sought to train the
emotional nature of man* At the present time religious educator
almost invariably take as their special educational problem the
development of a techinque for guiding growth of the emotions.
Ellwood, from the point of view of a sociologi st, makes the state-
ment that when the need of emotional guidance is recognized
a
41
"we shall turn to religion as the great educator of the social
emotions, we shall see that while science and democracy can
help, yet the final work of educating the emotions so that they
(41 )
shall support social idealism must be the work of religion".
33 is general recognition is now a fact. But not all are
turning to religion as the great teacher. Assumptions as to the
nature of man and his relation to the cosmos will determine
whether method recognized as scientific will be posi ti vi stically
or metaphysically grounded. The exponents of religion claim
their methods to be scientific. Behaviorism asserts that its
way alone is scientific. It is in this respect that behaviorism
and religion, agreeing in aim to control and recognizing the
importance of emotion, differ.
3. Assumptions of Behaviorism and Religion Underlying
The Method of Control "lake fundamental Agreement impossible.
a. Habit versus Ideal. ^/atson makes the oroblem of
growth central in psychology. Religion has come to recognize
salvation not as a price paid, but as a process of development,
an attainment of personality. Behaviorism would direct this
growth by the conditioning of habit responses, religion by the
inculcation of religious ideals.
The religious educator is not likely to accept habit
formation as the central principle in character formation, unless
he can make ideals the central value in habit. He sees habit
rather as an instrument. It is descriptive of the mechanics of
life, rather than of the rich content. Motivation of conduct lies
deeper where life shows spontaneity. freedom necessitates self
control under the direction of an ideal. If habits can assist
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in character "building through the establishing of the ideal
as the goal of endeavor, the habit is useful. But ideals have
references which habits do not possess.
b. An Ideal points To Values. The psychologist may
recognize the ideal as effective as a drive or as a center for
the formati m of a habit system. There it -egins and ends. For
the religionist ideals point to values as a part of the order of
things. Another difference is that the psychologist identifies
religious and moral values, the religionist believes religious
values are unique (43) it maybe said that Watson recognizes
no value in religion and therefore no religious values, however,
the fret that he would substitute ethics for reli £ ..i on indicates
that he identifies what is valuable in religion with ethical
values. Here again, the behavior ist viewpoint aight satisfy the
humanist. Such an idonti f i cation of their thought will be made
in the following chapter. But when value is considered as a real,
".. the value judgment xs pre-eminently the religious judgment"
The belief that ethical values point to religious values,
that the fact of value necessitates the postulation of God, is
the philosophy of Kant and 3orley.(50) The philosophy of Rudolph
Otto that religious values are as ori ;inal as ethical or aesthetic
values has served a timely purpose in counteracting the influence
of the explnnation of religi m in terns of its origin and that
a "natural •» origin.
It is this fundamental difference in belief as to the
nature of moral and religious values that separates the behav-
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iorist and the religionist. A fuller expression of the
implications of these two viewpoints as expressed in humanism
and theism will follow in the next chapter. The posit ionsof
the "oehaviorist and the religionist are irreconcilable, for
ultimately one finds purpose and value to be metaphysically
known and grounded In the Cosmos, the other to be empirically
known, and created in human relationships.
«
CHAPTER V
THE IHCNTI IPI CATION OF BEHAVIORISM
WITH HUMANISM
A. The Prowler- Of The Chapter
To discover the relation of behaviori stic principles
co religion we must relate them to religion through their
philosophical implications. Religion may be defined as man's
relationship to God, or to the extra-human environment. The
evaluations in Chapter III have to do with those assumptions
of behaviorism which pertain to the nature of man. Chapter
IV introduces the behaviori sti c implications wl.ich relate to
the nature of cosmic reality. Behaviorism speaks of God and
the cosmos only indirectly. The implication of behaviorism for
religion as it has to do with the nature of values and of God
is best exemplified in the religion known as humanism. More
precisely, the hum an i am of Ames may be taken as exemplary of
a religion which has a metaphysical basis similar oo that of
behaviorism. This does not imply that humanism takes behaviorism
as its psychology, nor that behavior i sm will develop into such
a religion. The fflb tsonian cure for religion is to abolish it.
Yet there are the assumptions in behaviorism on which a relig-
ion such as humanism might develop. It is che purpose of the
first part of this chapter to show thav behavioristic a..L-ump-
tions are identical with the more important foundations of
humanism
•
s
The objections brought against behaviorism in Chapter
III are those urged against a naturalistic conception of the
nature of mind and personality. The behaviori stic implications
for religion as it is conditioned "by the nature of man derive
from the the presuppositions of naturalism. This is the thesis
of the second part o f -his chapter*
B. The Assumptions of Behaviorism As Identical ,1th The presupposi-
tions of Human i sm
»
1. The Scientific Explanation )f phenomena is Correct
And Complete,
Ames describes the religion of his book Tr.e ::ew Orthodoxy
as "consistent with the mental habits of those trained in
sciences.. 11 . ( 51 ) Humanism is positivi stic . The welfare of
man is its goal. Science is the guide to a knowledge of that
better life. Moreover, science in the form of history, anthro-
pology, psychology accounts for the origin of religion without
the concept of the supernatural, lor humanism the psychological
description of religion is the ultimate description. Watson
carelessly dismisses the problem of theorigin of religion in
a few sentences,, to the effect that some person who did not
like to work with his hands discovered he could control others
through fear. Leuba, A*nes, or D*rkheira take more care in
accounting for the origin of religion, out their approach to
the problem is the same as v/atson»s. All seek expl .nation of
religion in terms of its origin or primitive form and assume
religious values are not unique, and that the true account of
the religious experience the scientific report gives.
2* Man»s Highest quest Is Ebr "Natural Good"
With Ames' statement that "religion has come to reckon
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with the fact that its highest qu£st is not for a supernatural
order, but just for natural goodness in largest and fullest
measure ", a" behaviorist might in part agree. Watson's substitu-
tion of experimental etj ic for religion, his desire that
scientific nethod be universally applied so as to bring in the
social good, might indicate as much. Such an entnusiam for
his cause
,
for the attainment of "natural ^ood" or "highest
social value 9 constitutes religion, according to the humanist.
Ames, however, as a guarantee of continuance of enthusiasm
would retain the old concepts of t: eistic religion. To con-
nerve the pov.-er attending the old religious concepts for the
advance lent of the social good, he would not give up the use
of word symbols which have religious meaning. The symbol may
be given a new 'leaning. God would then become a word which
"represents to our minds 'and wills the moral values and the
spiritual realities of life" ( 53 ) T: is personalization of
abstract values lakes them effective in the control of life.
This program for the increase of the better life Watson
would support, out he would not mi stale e Araes 1 method of
getting emotional support as scientific. A behaviorist would
not play with the question of God's existence. SUrthermore,
he is certain that emotion can be successfully controlled
through the conditioning of response. He would have no need
for an empty concept of God. The behaviorist knows nothing of
a "group mind" which might be projected as a god. He would
complete the process of eliminating God, which the humanist
b egan
.
Despite these differences , the fundamental assumption of
t*
behaviorism and humanism is the denial of the objective
reality of God,
3, The Source Of Value Is in The Natural Order Rather
Than In A Moral Order.
As a correlate of the positivistic method and the
acceptance of the highest good as social vaj.ue s is the
identification of the moral order with the natural order.
Values are discoverable through science. They originate and
are contained in man's endeavor. Values increase as man 1 s
knowledge of what is the valuable becomes more certain. Humanism
and behaviorism give us a melioristic and a naturalistic etnics.
The cosmic support for the values of theism is in God. This was
discussed in the preceding chapter . Behaviorism and humanism
are both limited by their theory of knowledge and their inter-
pretation of present in terms of past, of higher in terms of
lower, to a restricted naturalism which places all values,
ethical, and religious, and cognitive, in one realm of experience.
The moral order is nothing other than the natural order.
Behaviori sti c and humanistic ethical values need no extra-human
cosmic support .Ames is somewhat afraid to cake the consequences
of this implication of his theory of value, since for practical
purposes he invests an extra-human cosmic support in the God
projected into the universe, v/atson's position is entirely con-
(54)
sistent. The criticism of G. B. Smith that a humanistic
religion has no cosmic support for its values would not apply
to humanism did it not try to make a religion out of natural
values
•
»
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C . The postulates of Behaviorism and The ' je tarjhysi cal principles
of Naturalism .
1. Behaviorism is related to Naturalise In That It Is
positi vistic.
Watsonian 3ehaviorism claims to be nore than a Method,
Methodological Behaviorism, admitting the existence of conscious-
ness as something science cannot know, gives up the premise of
strict "behavior i s-n that consciousness properly identified, can
( 55)
be described by the principles of natural science. Conscious-
ness is implicit behavior. Those critics of ,vatson who iden-
tify behavior with matter and motion may conclude that the behav-
ior ist has become a metaphysician. He goes to naturalism for
his philosophical assumptions.
The assumptions of naturalism may be reviewed under the
divisions of positivism, mechanism, and materialism.
Lange makes the statement that materialism (or naturalism)
has been at times practically identified with the scientific
(56)
viewpoint. With new scientific discoveries have come new
revivals of materialism. This scientific method and viewpoint
is that of positivism. Science has appeared to be an ally of
naturalism. Proo^ by experimentation has, like behaviorism,
itself become more than a method. It carries implications con-
cerning the nature of reality. These implications of positivism
are those charged against behavioris-n in Chapter III.
Positivism has as its ideal a unified theory of nature and
the use of the same catefories in all the sciences, with the num-
ber of concepts reduced to a minimum. cMch uniformity demands
that the world be reduced to quantitative aspects, since this it
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is that scientific method may abstract and catalogue, science
(57 )
abstracts the measurable aspect of life. science is likely
to assume
,
then, that what cannot ultimately oe measured is not
real. The criticism of Watson is that he has taken the unity of
science not as an ideal, bufcaas a fact, and has set his problems
accordingly. All must be answered in the language of physics.
The positivistic assumption that t. e rethods of science are
final is related to the denial of mind or spirit. Behaviorism
in so far as it is positivistic is allied to naturalism,
2. Behaviorism and Naturalism Agr=e That The Real Is
qualitatively One.
The doctrine of naturalism is th it matter is real, and
the only reality. Mtnd is a form of matter* Behavior may be
defined as matter in motion, 'and by this definition fatson
is a materialist. His refusal to recognize consciousness as
unique, as something different from matter is a second point
of identification between behaviorism md naturalism. The denial
of spirit as operative in the universe, on thepart of naturalism,
corresponds to Watson's denial of consciousness as an organizing
principle in personality.
3. Mechanism, is Evidence of Cosmic Indifference to Values.
Mechanism interprets the order and growth in the world as
merely a reshifting of parts, a new arrangement of old substances
each new arrangement following directly and necessarily from the
one preceding. This reordering of parts does not produce anythin
new. water is simply two parts of hydrogen to one of oxygen, is
made of the old materials. Their relationship, the togetherness
of them in water is not productive of a new quality. Nothing
r
unique emerges with the new configuration.
Such a view of the structure of tilings, leaves no place
for creative activity, for spontaneity of development, for
choice of ends. Ehis has struck at the root of morality and
personality. The mind, or self, or soul, which materialism re-
duces to matter, mechanism eliminates as the motivation of ac-
tion, and a selective principle. such a principle as denies
the lack of need of an organizing force in personality is that
of the associational psychologist. Modern behaviorism, follow-
ing funct ionalism only in so far as it studies mind or thought
as continual adaptation, or as a biological function, is akin
to the associational psychology in denying the need of an assoc-
iative principle.
It has always been assumed that mechanism was exclusive
of teleology and incompatible with purposive activity and that
it eliminated all values. Mechanism has not sought for values
in the cosmic process, nor in human behavior. flatson through
the identification of thinking with behavior has followed
mechanism in eliminating the possibility of the category of
value •
The question of the validity of and the change in the
(53
problems created by the opposition of naturalism and idealism
will be discussed in Chapter VI.
r
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CHAPT7K VI
TIE RESTATEMENT 0^
PH IL0 SOPH ie AL PROBLEMS
A# Implications Of The Identification Of Behaviorism yith
Na tural i an
Chapter IV includes a discussion of the psychological
explanation of religion and a Briticism of the behaviori stic
ethic. The assumptions underlying such a psychology of
eligion and a practical pro ram of social control are in the
:~irst section of Chapter V shown to be identical with humanis-
tic metaphysics. The second section identifies the assumptions
of "behaviorism with the presuppositions of naturalism.
It follows from Chapter V that behaviorism is related to
religion as humanistic religion to theistic, or as naturalistic
philosophy to a religious interpretation of life. since the
principles of humanism are discussed as those phases of natural-
ism which pertain to the super-human phase of religion, the
assumptions of behaviorism may be summarized in the problems of
naturalism. In fact, behavior i sm is denounced as being ''merely
a philo sophi cal attitude as applied to subject natter in osy-
(59)
chology". Pra>-t also calls behaviorism a me taphysics,
a
resolution of methodological difficulties by metaphysical
(60 )
assumptions, which assumptions are those of naturalism.
If behaviorism is to be identified with naturalism,
whatever befalls natur alism will affect behaviorism, and its
relation to religious problems. Naturalism is being reinter-
preted, and the old arguments modified. These changes and
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their significance are the subject of this chapter.
B. The Possibility Of A Restatement Of problems Dividing
Philosophy .
1. The present tendency in philosophy to synthesize appar-
ently contradictory ideas points to a possible reconciliation.
The present tendency in philosophy is toward the elimination
of some of the old problems through a new definition of terms.
Perry concludes his study of recent philosophy with the statement
that the divisions between the schools of modern philosophy are
(61)
breaking down. A reading of philosophy verifies the statement.
Mind and matter, mechanism and teleology, freedom and determinism,
are in one way or another included within each other. Metaphysics
itself is reinterpreted: "....there are ....two ways of being
metaphysical". 5Jle old way is to make the ultimates non-perceptible
forces, entelechies, or spirit. In the newer metaphysics "life and
mind are empirically recognizable where they occur, though not per-
ceptive in the sense of consisting merely of patterns Qf sense-data
(62)
with their relations of coexistence and succession.. ..".
A reconciliation in these problems which have divided phil-
osophy will affect the relation of science and religion and of
behaviorism and religion, since religion is through philosophy
related to science. a "new materialism" might not be opposed to
religion. On the other hand, in the new statement of problems
other divisions might arise.
2. A final reconc i liation^ ?^jpMj^opjiical jsontroversies is
unlikely
.
Both Pillsbury and Russell believe that any final adjust
ment of conflicting problems is impossible. The conflict originates

in the psychological difference in minds. There are two
types of minds in the world which create these different phil-
osophies. The wrangle ah out freedom and determinism Russell
accounts for as coming from men who have had a "passion for
(63 )power and a passion for safety*1 . Pillsbury sees value
in the division, for it adds zest to psychological meetings
(64)
and keeps the world from being dull.
There are perhaps less subjective reasons for the doubt
that reconciliation can be made. Mechanism and teleology may
be shown to be complementary aspects of one process, matter
and spirit to be related as 'substance and function, determin-
ism to be involved in freedom. This would create a new world
in which to begin philosophy again. Against such a background,
however, new problems a3 divisive as those that ere it e the
present differences might arise. Eddington reduces all dif-
(65 )
ferences to that between the measurable and non-measurable.
This difference centers in the problem 0^ knowing the world.
Measure is a means to scientific knowledge and explanation.
Science abstracts from reality the measurable. The interest
of science and that of religion are therefore different.
.Another account of the likelihood of a lasting division
in philosophy is that given by G. P. Conger. He sees all
philosophies as divided into system and meaning. The field of
(66)
philosophy may always show this same duality. Such a divis-
ion is accounted for by the •imjlici ty duality of thinking".
4
5*
If a new alignment of philosophical problems were to
follow such a division, science would explain in terms of
system and religion in terms of meaning. System and meaning are
essentially the special interests of science and religion. 2d-
dington's reduction of reality :o the measurable and non-measurable
aspects might be stated in terms of system and meaning* Also the
charge of religion that science cannot report on ultimate reality
night be interpreted in terms of system and aning. Science
describes the system. Religion seeks the ie;tning. This division
into system and meaning appears in the form of the problem of
knowl edge
.
3. Elimination of conflicts through synthesis makes for
the concentration of the problem into fewer forms,
a. The mind-body problem may be stated in terms
of mechanism and teleology
The newer definitions of natter and spirit, teleology
and mechanism, determinism and freedom, leading to a system in
which both are included, serve to reduce the multiple arguments
against naturalism into fewer problems, if not into one single,
complex one. The mind-body problem relates closely with the
question of mechanism md teleology, and my be stated in those
terras. \s long as matter was conceived as a heavy, solid stuff
out of which things were made it seemed necessary to posit another
essence called spirit to account for mental activity. Matter and
spirit were taken to be opposite entities in the world system.
But since physics has discovered the unit of matter to be centers
of electrons and protons
,
this assumed difference between matter
and spiritual forces has been leso easj to define. The conception
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of what spirit rig./ be has also changed. Spirit has been related
to matter as a function, or as a resultant of a new configuration
of matter. The desire to save spirit or mind means that people
want an account of causality. Only a few are content to
save consciousness as a non- causal principle. The mechanistic
theory of life has been opposed because it provided for no
spiritual cause, and made no provision for value.
b. A reint erpretation of mechanism and teleology
under the principle of causation provides for
purposive activity within mechanism
Mechanism has usually been allied with matter,
teleology and vitalism with spirit. The first step in the reval-
uation of mechanism was to deny that vitalism is necessarily
related to either acceptance of mind or self
,
or to purposive
activity, 'ftss Calkins emphatically states that her self psychol-
ogy is opposed to mechanism, but only in so far as this is it in
agreement with vitalism. The self is not the non*physical cause
(67)
the vitalist posits . Kb fflea rejects vitalism as necessary
to an explanation of purposive activity.
The next step is to reconcile teleology and mechan-
ism. Hoernie agrees to state the contradiction as '•not mechanism
( 68)
or vitalism, but mechanism and teleology* His rejection of
vitalism carries with it the rejection of any essential opposition
between mechanism and teleology. Ideological concepts are
necessary to explain the "dominant" character of life, which has
its foundations in the mechanical, physico-chemical proce ses,
Teleology is not t3 e old concept of design, but of "value, which
permits us to read relations of cause and effect as also relations
(69)
of means to ends". Cause and effect is a mechanical concept;
means and end
,
a teleolc. ical concept. The mechanical inter pre-
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tat ion involves cause and effect; the teleological interpreta-
tion value. This is one means of disputing the disjunction,
and uniting mechanism and teleology. There are other methods.
The most inclusive reconciliation is attained by a re-
definition of cause. 80 long as cause and effect are in a time
sequence of antecedent and consequent, the mechanical interpre-
tation may be exclusive of means and end. But if cause and
effect are not something separated from, each other by an unknown
nexus and linked serially, out are both parts of a whole situa-
tion in which it is difficult to say which is "cause" and which
"effect", purpose may be accounted for, and made possible under
a concept of mechanism. This total complexity holds the condi-
tion of the future everit and the future event as itself a part
of the cause.
the explanation of the cause of disease the germ, which is in
relation to its environment
,
is a factor in causation, but of
itself it is not the cause of disease. In psychology this same
idea is expressed in the theory of "configuration". 7/atson also
provides for the determining factor in the total situation.
ining systems provide for value. This appears to me to be the
important point in the mechanism-teleology problem; or even
in the matter-spirit controversy, which leads into that of mech-
anism-teleology. Whether life is spiritual and teleological
or material and mechanistic is of no great importance so
ong as the system allows for value. A recent speculation
Ooe, in a discussion
The question remains, however, whether these self determ-
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as to the nature of that something which philosophy and religion
have sought to save in the concents of spirit and teleology is
(71)
that it is characterized not by consciousness, hut "by goodness.
Goodness is a value concept.
c. The mechanism- teleology problem may be answered
in terras of the limitation of scientific method.
The systems just discussed would account for value as
a part of the "natural order ;'. Science has no other place for
value. Religion has put its values in a supernatural or other than
natural order. So long as values are in a supernatural order,
science cannot account for them, nor deny them. It can only do
nothing. Value is expressed in the natural order. And value also
is the irreducible division between science and religion, between
religion and vatsonian behaviorism. Behaviorism has failed to
give an account of mind which is inclusive of value. Science
generally has failed to recognize religious values because its
categories are not such as to include value. The essential nature
of life escapes the scientific explanation.
That such a division between what is known by science
and otherwise, or between value and net-value, goodness and not-
goodness, should remain as the wall or partition between science
and religion or naturalism and not-naturalism may imply no contra-
diction in the world system, nor antagonism in the two viewpoints.
Both methods of knowledge may be valid and '•natural- 1', and the
disjunction between them signify only that they, are ways of know-
ing and reporting on the "measurable" an d"non-measurable »
,
or
on ••system" and "meaning*. The difference may denote the differ-
ence between thinking and living.
c
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C. A how Materialism Reculti;-.g gron Re a cement Of Philo sophical
Probl ems Has Condition e d The Arguments Again st Naturalism and
Behavio r i an
Regardless o^ the extent to which the problems of
philosophy may be reduced, the fact remains that changing con-
cepts compel a revision of the old arguments against materialism
and naturalism. This new statement is in the making. The
relation of the interests of religion to the theories of science
are uncertain. The old ways o f answering the arguments of
naturalism by vitalism or by a theory of knowledge which amounted
to questioning the possibility of knowledge are no longer acceptable.
Chapter V showed behaviori stic assumptions to be those of
naturalism. Th# newer ways 0"° replying to naturalism carry with
them a different attitude toward the problem than that shown in
much of current discussion of behaviorism as it influences
religious problems . The answer given to natur ilism by the
theories of emergent evolution is to provide for the spiritual
as unique by dividing the world not cross-section-wise, to find
there two diverse elements, matter and spirit; but time-wise,
to find a new quality arising in the new emerging situation or
configuration.
The "configurati ve " character of the habit systems of
behaviori sti c psychology may not be such as to provide for
purposive activity, nor the definition of thought as behavior
to provide for meaning. If such is the case religion and behav-
iorism may never be friends. However, religion should restate
its arguments against behaviorism, in consideration of these

i changing philosophical and scientific concep
f
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIOIT AND SUMMARY
A . Objections To 3ehaviori s.m are 3iased liy The Ident ification
Of Behaviorism ,yith I'atur ali
s j_
.
Some of the objections to behaviorism appear to follow
from the fact that behaviorism, was taken to oe materialistic
and mechanistic,, rather zhr-vn from an understanding of behavior-
ism. This has precluded a disinterested discussion and a
recognition of certain features of behaviorism which, if admitted,
might have modified the objections. It is impossible to
criticise fairly without understanding the meaning of the words
the opponent uses. It does not follow that a just criticism of
behaviorism would have found it correct, nor allied with a
philosophy other than naturalism. 3ut the evaluation of behav-
iorism might have been different.
Such misinterpretations are general and touch every part
too often
of Watson's system. It is/supposed Li.at he gives no value to
the verbal report in psychological investigation* Ke does, however,
recognize the words of the subject as data reliable for scientific
use. He differs from the introspectioni st rather in his interpreta-
tion of wiit). t verbal report is. Likewise, the general criticism
that behaviorism omits faces is questionable. It is only if mis-
interpretation means denial, that Watson can be said to omit facts.
The critics of behaviorism "nave for most part failed to
recognize Watson's statement that stimulus and response are com-
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plex and are to "toe studied as a part o r the total integrated
human organism. The "configurati ve " element in behaviorism is
overlooked
.
B . The affect of Vfetsonian Behaviorism Qn Other ocho j Is Of
Psychology Is Re .'lee ted In philosophy And Religion .
The strict vViatsonian behaviorism has undoubtedly in part
effected the wide acceptance of some type of behaviorism. Nearly
every psj^-chology is in some respect "behavior i sti c . The psychology
of Watson, in relating psychology more closely to physiology and
zoology and thereby to mechanical interpretations, has been a
factor in the developmento f the more general use of mechanistic
(72)
concepts, a?idin the r einterpretation of them. Since psychological
problems are central in philosophical theories, strict behaviorism
has through, its general influence on psychology, helped to
ere .te a new psychological outlook o^ which philosophy takes ac-
count. Strict behaviorism has then indirectly effected modifica-
tions in t.; e philosophical interpretation of life and in the
religious demi.nd as to what life may give.
C . A Synthesis Of Two Important Ide^.s
interpretation of life raid Rudolph Otto»s answer to those who by
a historical-psychological study of religion :nake it illusory
are both influencing present thinking in philosophy and eligi on
.
Rudolph Otto *s belief that 2 eligious values are as unique and
original as ethical or aesthetic values and the idea of configura-
tion are combined in Morgan's idea, which makes religious values
(70)dependent upon a "newly emergent attitude of mind" This
The idea of config;,ration in scientific and philosophical
r
attitude of mind does not create the values. Mind has reached
in that new emergence a state in which the mind can distinguish
between "spiritual value" and "spiritual unvalue". This
recogni7.es the configurati ve character of mind and the unique
original character of religious values, value is not here made
dependent on unity. The configuration is of value because it
has new powers. It may be that behaviorism cannot be harmonized
with such an explanation, since for '.vatson the new is merely a
( 71$ )
new arrangement or pattern or integration of old parts. \*
D. Religion As Creative Experience Is prior To Psychological
Interpretation
.
Thought is less than life. Thought does not produce
the fact. It merely seeks to interpret what life creates*
Religion is an aspect of the creative experience. Thought may
clarify or reinterpret or evaluate that experience but it does
not precede it nor ever entirely eliminate it. The arguments
for religion may be founded in reason, but religion originates
in living experience, not in thought. Psychology, behavioristic
or otherwise, is related to religion somewhat as thought to life.
Psychology can only interpret and evaluate the religious exper-
ience. It may be inevitable that scientific thought cannot
represent the rich fullness of life. If psychology can deal only
in the mechanical, deterministic, and measurable aspects of
life, religion will ever deny that it gives a full and true ac-
count. Ultimately the argument of religion against behaviorism,
as against any other psychology or natural science, may be that
the method of science does not give all the truth.
cr
63
SUMMARY
The thesis may be briefly summarized as follows: It
is Watson's use of the ''verbal report" as objective data which
differentiates his method from that of other psychologists.
This is of importance only as it necessitates the assumption
that consciousness is behavior.
The personality, vyatson believes, is a complex of habit
systems; emotional, manual, and laryngeal, which are built up
by the conditioning of responses and stimuli. Both stimuli and
responses are highly complex. Responses are variable. The
factors of the stimulus or situation which are most potent in
determining the exact response the organism will make are the
immediately past experiences of the individual, the intra organ-
ic conditions, and the total past history.
By the understanding and control of habit formation Vat-
son believes it will be possible to train any individual in any
way one may desire. Ability is determined by physical structure
and training, when the social sciences discard the use of the
term '•soul" as their fundamental concept, and when scientific
principles are universally employed in control of conduct, then
?jatson says trie way will be open to an adequate control of
social development. Both religion and ethics will become ex-
perimental and religion will become ethics.
Behaviorism aims, as does religion, to control behavior.
Both agree that the training of the emotions is highly impor-
tant if conduct control is to be at all possible. But the agree-
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raent goes only thus far. Behaviorism would control through
the building of habits by the conditioning of responses. Relig-
ion would control through the power of a religious ideal as
prior to habit formation. The behaviorist finds moral values
to be empirically discovered and contained entirely within the
social group. The religionist believes that the moral ideal
points beyond to a universe which sanctions, and even creates,
those ideals.
The metaphysical assumptions of behaviorism are found
to be identical with those of humanism and naturalism; with
humanism in that both reject the objective reality of God, with
naturalism in that both reduce all to matter, deny a causal
force other than the mechanics of the world or the body, and
reject knowledge not empirically acquired.
Since behaviorism has been identified with naturalism
and the criticism of it is in large part that directed against
naturalism, a restatement of the philosophical problems involving
distinctions between matter and spirit, mechanism and teleology,
and freedom and determinism, will be reflected in any satis-
factory evaluation of behaviorism. There is a tendency in
philosophy to find these concepts less contradictory. They are
seen to be complementary. ?or all except the positivist, how-
ever, the world remains divided on the basis of how it can be
known. science may abstract and know the measurable aspects
of reality. But there remains undescribed in scientific terms
that non-measurable aspect of life of which the religious
experience is a part.
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1
32 34. Koffka, Kurt, op. cit., pp 105*106.
34 35. Betts and Hawthorne, -Jethod in Teachi ng Religion,
PP 52-53.
34 36. Bmae and Stevick, pr in cipl es of Religious Edu cation, p 22.
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School Education
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35 39. Ibid., p 51.
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33 41. Korton, waiter Marshall, "The objective Element in The
.experience of God", Journal of R el igion
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'/ (194?), 541
33 4 2. Valentine, G. H. Modern psychol ogy and the Validity of
Th e Chr i s t i an ^ptp e_r i en ce, p 22.""
33 43. Goe, George A. "Scientific Explanation and personal
Values", The Journal of Religion, 6 (1926) 235.
39 44. Athearn, "'ft Iter 3., Gfr - -tract er Building i n a Democracy ,
P 1X9'-
40 45. Bnme and Stevick, principle s of Religious EdjAcation .
p 74.
40 46. Meyer, Adolph, in suggestions of ~?odern ocience Concern-
ing Education, by ''.3. Jennings, and others, p 43
.
41 47. Ellwood, Charles \., Christianity and Social Science.
P 157.
42 43. The most widely quoted work is that of Rudolph Otto,
( Das Heilige ) The Idea of The Holy . Gee also pp 303-
306 Science, Reli/ ion ~.r. -i Reality
,
*ps 42 49. waterhouse, Brie 3., T&e Philosophy of Religious Exper-
?y ience , p 146.
4 2 50. In Sorley's system the relation of the natural and moral
order requires God as the ground of such a reality,
aimmarized on pp 512, 514, Moral Va lues and The idea of
God.
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51. Ames, Edward Scribner, The New Orthodoxy, p. 47.
52. Ibid., p. 93-
53. Ibid., p. 51.
54. Smith, Gerald Birney, "Is Theism Essential to Religion?".
The Journal of Religion, 5 (19 25) 356-377
55- Lashley, K.S., "The Behaviori stic View of Consciousness",
The psycholog ical Review, pp 237 - 245
.
56. Lange, "Frederick Albert, The History of Materialism, p v.
57. Eddingtnn, Arthur S., in Science Re l igion and Reality,
p. 197 - 203.
58. Idealism used in its broadest sense.
59. Roback, A. A., Behaviorism and psychology , p. 32.
60. Pratt, J.B., Matter and Spirit
, p. 120
61. perry, Ralph Barton, Philosophy of the Recent pa st,
pp 221, 222.
62. Hoernle, R . V . Alfred, Studies in Cont emporary Metaphysic s
.
P 94-.
63. Lange, "Frederick Albert, op.cit., p xvi
64. pillsbury, w.B., '•Suggestions for a Compromise of Existing
Controversies in psychology", The psychological Review.
29 (19 22) 259 - 266.
65. Eddington, Arthur S., op. cit., pp 200 , 201.
65© G. P. Conger's definition of philosophy is, "philosophy
is discussion of a world as constituting a system and
conditioning meanings". I give here only a few of the
illustrations of the fact that philosophy has seen the
world as system and meaning:
philosopher system Meaning
Plato Actual Ideal
Aristotle Actual Potential
Locke primary Secondary
Bradley Appearance Reality
Royce External Internal
meaning meaning
Bergson Intelligence Intuition
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It is the problem of philosophy to unite these, but that
it has not done so may be due to the "implicit duality of
thought". The conditions of thinking are such that system
and meaning have persisted in the different philosophies.
"Prom notes in "Introduction to philosophy*, a course in
the University of Minnesota given by G. P. Conger.
55 67. Calkins, Mary Wiiton, "Purposing Self versus potent Soul M ,
Journal of philosophy, psychology, and Scientific Method,
14 (1917) PP 197 «V
55 68. Hoernle R.F. Alfred, op. cit., p 143.
55 69. Ibid., p 146.
56 70 Coe, George A., op cit. p 230
•
57 71- Spaulding, Edward G., in Christianity and Modern Thought,
p 73 • He agrees with Eddington that reality may be
divided into the measurable and non-measurable.
6l 72. Perry says so general is its use that the "term mechanical'
has come to stand for scientific explanation in general",
P 143, General Theory of Value .
61 73. Morgan, C- Lloyd, Emergent Evolution, pp 296-297
62 74. Ibid., p 290-291.
62 75- W&tson, John B. , Behavior is-n. p 138.
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